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Reinforcement Learning in Conflicting
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Abstract—In this work, we investigate the application of Reinforcement Learning to two well known decision dilemmas, namely
Newcomb’s Problem and Prisoner’s Dilemma. These problems are exemplary for dilemmas that autonomous agents are faced with
when interacting with humans. Furthermore, we argue that a Newcomb-like formulation is more adequate in the human-machine
interaction case and demonstrate empirically that the unmodified Reinforcement Learning algorithms end up with the well known
maximum expected utility solution.
F
1 MOTIVATION
Autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)
are used for a wide range of oceanographic, maritime min-
ing, and military tasks including underwater surveys, in-
spection and maintenance of submerged structures, tracking
oceanographic features, and undersea mapping to name a
few (cf. [8]). Depending on their task, the physical shape
of UUVs can be the traditional torpedo-shaped bodies or
more like Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) with many
manipulators, cameras, and lights.
The difficulty with autonomous submarines is that there
is no communication link between a human operator due
to the fact that radio waves cannot penetrate water very far.
Therefore, the UUV loses its GPS signal as soon as it enters
the water. Navigation is mostly performed using compasses,
depth sensors, accelerometers, and sonars. The sensor infor-
mation provides enough information for navigation using
dead reckoning but are not sufficient to make an informed
decision.
In the upcoming deep sea mining scenarios, where well-
heads are built as subsea systems directly on the sea floor,
ROVs and UUVs are used to build and maintain those
structures. As direct human control is only possible with
tethered ROVs, an increased usage of UUVs to maintain
subsea systems is desirable. Using underwater acoustic po-
sitioning systems (long-baseline (LBL) systems), UUVs are
able to find subsea structures like wellheads and process-
ing systems. Only acoustic communication allows limited
communication like broadcasting alarms.
In such a scenario an unmanned underwater vehicle
needs advanced autonomous decision making algorithms
for task planning and behavior selection. Furthermore, in
case of multiple cooperating robots and operator controlled
vehicles, strategies for cooperating and solo actions have to
be developed and risk analysis is vital [10]. Besides tradi-
tional risk assessment using event and fault tree analysis,
risk can also be assessed using examples from game theory
like the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Newcomb’s Problem.
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We investigate these examples by applying Reinforcement
Learning (RL).
Reinforcement Learning, one classic decision making
and learning technique in the field of autonomous learning,
fits the setting of the two dilemmas very well, and has been
already applied in basic Prisoner’s Dilemma scenarios. In
[2], the authors apply RL to multi-player domains, where
cooperation is beneficial and investigate the capability of
two agents successfully establishing a stable equilibrium
strategy. The authors of [1] present the performance of RL
algorithms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, admitting knowl-
edge of the problem structure. They distinguish between
independent learners, where each agent has no knowledge
about the state of the other agents, and multi-agent settings,
where a joint decision is reached. They aim at establishing
cooperation, which can be reached with a biased exploration
strategy. Sandholm et al. [7] study the play of a RL agent
against a fixed opponent strategy and itself. They manage
to achieve optimal play by using a history of moves and a
representation of the move history by a neural network as
the state. On the contrary, Flache et al. [4] take a different
approach, which tries to explain the cooperative behavior
observed in experiments with a general psychologically
inspired reinforcement learning model.
2 MODELLING DEEP SEA ROBOTS USING
NEWCOMB-LIKE PROBLEMS
Newcomb’s problems arise when an autonomous agent
is in a situation where others have knowledge about its
decision process via some mechanism (e.g. a statistical based
model) that is not under its direct control. Newcomb-like
problems cannot be handled by the conventional Causal
Decision Theory, as the independence of the two decision
makers is violated. Also most real decisions humans face
are Newcomb-like, at least whenever other humans are
involved. People automatically involve their experience and
read unconscious or unintentional signals in order to build
an internal social model of how someone decides. Simulta-
neously, they use those models to make their own choices
and this when Causal Decision Theory fails.
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In general, real world decision scenarios can be often
described as Newcomb-like problems in several ways. We
however, do not assume a priori knowledge of the problem
structure and instead treat the decisions made as a variation
of a two-armed bandit. Furthermore, we restrict ourselves
to the setting of independent learners. Namely, two actors,
which can be characterized by their probability of coop-
eration in the respective scenario. This is possible, as we
can establish the equivalence of this specific version of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma with Newcomb’s Problem.
2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma in Deep Sea Repair Robots
In our example of a field of multiple oil wells and two avail-
able maintenance robots, two failures with smaller leakages
occur at the same time. Each leakage can be fixed by one
robot, but there is a chance of the robot to be damaged in
the process. Also, if the leakages are both not fixed, there
will be a cascade of events that will cause an even bigger
oil spill. If both robots fix both leaks, then there will be no
oil spill but still the chance of slight damage to the robot
remains. If one robot tries to fix one spill and the other
decides not to, then there will be no natural desaster, but
the second leak will still remain. Also the robot trying to
fix the spill will be severely damaged as the second spill
causes complications with the first leak. Underwater, the
robots have no communication to coordinate whether they
will go for a repair or not, but can sense the location of the
leaks and the other robots with a sonar.
An exemplary payout matrix (regrets are treated as
negative payouts) for this problem is depicted in Table 1,
with R = −2.000, the cost of the repair and eventual
minor damages of the robot, S = −4.000, the cost of major
damages to the robot due to the overpressure from the other
leak as well as the costs for the oil spilled, T = −1.000, the
costs of the oil spill by not fixing the leak, P = −3.000, the
cost of the major oil spill due to both leaks not getting fixed.
Clearly, it satisfies all the prereqisites to be a version of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma with having the two conditions
T > R > P > S and R >
T + S
2
. (1)
fulfilled. The dilemma unfolds as follows: since the temp-
TABLE 1: Oil Spill Prisoner’s Dilemma Robot-Robot Regrets.
Robot 2
Repair No Repair
Robot 1 Repair (R, R) (S, T)No Repair (T, S) (P, P)
tation T is the lowest regret a robot can receive while the
sucker’s regret S is the highest, the optimal strategy for a
robot locally would be to always not repair (defect) since
the action of the other robot is unknown. The robot therefore
has no incentive to change its decision, if it is unclear what
the other will do. This situation is also known as Nash
equilibrium in game theory.
If both robots would know what the other does or
would be able to communicate about a common strategy,
then clearly mutual cooperation (both repair) would be the
optimal thing to do. Herein lies the dilemma. Locally, it
is optimal for each robot to not repair while globally it
would be optimal to repair each leak. For this dilemma
to occur, we need the first condition to be fulfilled. Then
the second condition prevents taking turns at defection and
cooperation to be more profitable in an iterated setting.
A robot could now concretely decide what to do using
the expected utility of each outcome. This means that it
assigns a certain cooperation probability p to the problem,
which gives the likelihood that the other robot will choose
repair. As the problem is symmetrical, we can write down
the expected utility EU as{
EU(repair) = p ∗ (−2.000) + (1− p) ∗ (−4.000),
EU(no repair) = (1− p) ∗ (−1.000) + p ∗ (−3.000). (2)
If therefore the chance of the other robot cooperating is
greater than p = 0.75 then the robots will cooperate and
both choose repair.
2.2 Imbalance in Prisoner’s Dilemma due to Human
Interaction
If now a human happens to be involved in the dilemma,
the situation changes drastically. Suppose a maintenance
worker is underway in a single person submarine to carry
out maintenance tasks that cannot be handled by au-
tonomous robots yet. In this moment the situation described
prior unfolds and two leaks have to be fixed. Compared to
the regret, when a robot gets damaged, the regret, when
the submarine carrying the human gets damaged, is much
higher. The event in which the human solely decides to fix
one leak and an accident happens is now valued with a
regret of −1.000.000. The modified payout matrix is written
down in Table 2. As can easily be seen, the regret situation
TABLE 2: Oil Spill Prisoner’s Dilemma Robot-Human Re-
grets.
Human
Repair No Repair
Robot 1 Repair (−2.000,−2.000) (−4.000,−1.000)No Repair (−1.000,−1.000.000) (−3.000,−3.000)
is now highly skewed, since the life of a human naturally is
weighted much higher than the integrity of the replaceable
robot. Therefore, the robot would still decide to repair
according to expected utility starting from a confidence of
pr = 0.75 that the human will also repair, whereas the
human would only decide to go down for a repair if she/he
is almost sure with a confidence of ph = 0.999 that the robot
will follow and do it’s job.
2.3 Modelling a Skewed Prisoner’s Dilemma with New-
comb’s Problem
The classical Prisoner’s Dilemma cannot fully accompany
skewed problems of this type. But fortunately, as Lewis
stated [5], the Prisoner’s Dilemma can be seen as two cou-
pled Newcomb’s Problems. In the original description of the
Newcomb’s Problem, a superhuman intelligence is predict-
ing the choice the player is going to make and placing the
bets on the two options available accordingly. The coupled
Newcomb’s Problem from the viewpoint of the Robot in the
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TABLE 3: Oil Spill Dilemma Newcomb Version, Robot View-
point.
Robot
Repair No Repair
Predict: Human Repair −2.000 −1.000
Predict: Human No Repair −4.000 −3.000
asymmetrical dilemma can be observed in Table 3. In our
version, instead of the superhuman intelligence predicting
our choices, we predict how the opponent (in this case the
human) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma version of the problem
will behave. Depending on the prediction accuracy, the
payout can be observed upon choosing one of the actions.
Originally, the prediction probability was set very close to
p = 1.0 and therefore the dilemma again manifests itself
in that the expected utility recommends to do the opposite
of the dominating choice. By following the argumentation
in the work of Nozick [6], the robot now can choose to not
repair, since both outcomes of not repairing are better than
their alternatives, no matter if the prediction was correct
or not. If we insert the numbers in the above formulas for
expected utility then, on the other hand, with a very high
probability that the prediction was correct, it is better to
choose to repair.
Using this modified problem formulation, we can now
write down the regrets from the viewpoint of the human
in Table 4. As these are now two decoupled problems,
TABLE 4: Oil Spill Dilemma Newcomb Version, Human
Viewpoint.
Human
Repair No Repair
Predict: Robot Repair −2.000 −1.000
Predict: Robot No Repair −1.000.000 −3.000
it is additionally possible to assign different cooperation
probabilities to the two involved entities. Usually, we would
assign a very high cooperation probability to a robot as it
should do what it is supposed to do, but in the setting of
autonomous decision making with limited communication
under water, we cannot be so sure anymore. Also for hu-
mans, depending on the situation, cooperation probability
can exhibit a great variance.
3 SIMULATION RESULTS USING REINFORCEMENT
LEARNING
To assess how an autonomous robot would learn to decide
in a deep sea repair scenario, we can now use the above
models to simulate behavior. The autonomous learning
technique we chose to test is unmodified Reinforcement
Learning, to get a baseline of the most popular autonomous
learning algorithms that currently exist in the literature.
It is important to notice that in our setting of decision
making, one decision maker plays against her/his oppo-
nent with a fixed cooperation or prediction probability. In
other words, there is no state information required for both
Newcomb’s or the Prisoner’s Dilemma type of formulation.
Hence, we model our problems as playing a bandit. Specif-
ically, for each action a ∈ An := {repair, no repair}
we maintain the Q function without the state variable as
Q(a) = E [
∑
t γ
trt], which represents the future expected
discounted reward, where t is the current iteration step,
γ ∈ [0, 1] a discounting factor and rt the payout received
at iteration step t. The two problems are evaluated in an
iterated fashion. This means that the agent is not faced with
the decision only once, but for N times and can therefore
learn from those interactions.
For updating the Q values, we use the well known
SARSA [9] algorithm with learning rate α. A second learn-
ing agent is calculating averaged payouts for the Q function
(AVGQ). A third agent calculates expected utility (EU) for
comparison. As the action selection mechanism, we chose
an -greedy strategy, where the action with the largest
corresponding Q value is chosen most of the times and a
random action with probability . In each problem, learning
was studied for N = 10000 iteration steps and averaged
over 50 independent runs.
For the Newcomb formulation, we additionally imple-
mented two baseline agents, that either always repair or
don’t repair. If now the prediction accuracy is varied, the
payout behaves as expected, which can be seen in Figure 1a.
For the SARSA agent, we can observe adaptation to
the problem depending on the prediction accuracy. In Fig-
ure 1b, we can observe that the agent will always choose
no repair if the cooperation probability is close to zero,
and always repair if the probability is very high. If this
probability accuracy is approximately 0.75, then the agent
cannot learn what to do and chooses actions at random.
The RL agent therefore is able to learn the correct behavior
depending on the environmental parameters. The averageQ
(AVGQ) implementation learns to behave in the same way,
even closer to the expected utility solution. In accordance to
this behavior, the payout varies as shown in Figure 1c.
What we can conclude from Figures 1b and 1c is that
the RL agent is able to learn the action that maximizes the
payout and corresponds with the expected utility solution.
This means in a consistent environment where the partner
almost always cooperates or does the opposite, learning will
succeed. For cooperation probabilities around the expected
utility threshold (p = 0.75), the behavior is not perceived as
consistent and the best the SARSA agent can do is to choose
actions in a random manner.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma formulation, we can imagine
two modes of operation. Namely, either each agent receives
only its own regret, or both agents receive the sum of the
two regrets. In Figures 2a and 2b, it can be seen that for
individual payouts no repair always dominates repair,
while for the sum of payouts repair dominates. This
reflects the dilemma in the underlying problem and it would
therefore be optimal for the RL agents to learn either to not
repair (in the individual payout setting) or to repair (in the
sum-of-regret setting). This is in fact the case if we consider
the results from Figure 2c, in which the regrets for the
SARSA and AVGQ agents are depicted for the individual
(I) and sum (T) regret setting.
4 CONCLUSION
In this abstract, we study the behavior of basic unmodi-
fied reinforcement learning agents, when faced with de-
cision theoretic thought experiments. In both problems,
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0.1, γ = 0.9,  = 0.1, AVGQ and EU.
Probability of repairing on y-axis.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Cooperation Probability
-4.0k
-3.5k
-3.0k
-2.5k
-2.0k
-1.5k
-1.0k
Pa
yo
ut
SARSA
AVGQ
EU
(c) Payout for SARSA (same parame-
ters), AVGQ and EU for varying coop-
eration probability.
Fig. 1: Experimental results for Newcomb’s Problem, Robot View.
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Fig. 2: Experimental results for the Prisoner’s Dilemma formulation.
Newcomb’s Problem and Prisoner’s Dilemma, RL learning
algorithms learned to take actions according to the maxi-
mum expected utility solution. This is due to the fact that
RL maximizes the cumulative expected reward, which is
in these settings similar to the expected utility. In some
situations, it might be not desirable to decide according
to utility, therefore other techniques from causal decision
theory are to be investigated in conjunction with learning
algorithms from the field of autonomous systems.
Most existing works in the literature attempt to steer RL
agents towards favourable decision equilibria by the use of
modified RL algorithms. Our present results have verified
that both rewarding procedure (what to reward) and the
reward structure (how do we reward) are the most crucial
points in shaping the agents decision. It is then beneficial
to investigate further into reward shaping mechanisms or
other means of rewarding. One example could be the inte-
gration of moral values, as proposed in [3]. The research in
this direction could open the field of RL to a much broader
philosophical discussion in decision making.
In respect of robotics, our results show how autonomous
action planning in conflicting situations can be simulated.
Adjusting the cooperation probabilities according to statis-
tical data enables the simulation of different assumptions
about a potential cooperation partner. The technique can be
integrated into future action planning algorithms of service
and maintenance robots. It is also conceivable to use it in
autonomous cars to assess different traffic situations. The car
would be able to simulate different outcomes of maneuvers
according to statistical data for the probabilities of breaking
or obeying traffic rules.
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